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Abstract 
Analyzing the internationalization of large companies from small countries requires 
understanding the process of internationalization by examining the interface between micro 
(firm strategies) and macro (the forces of centripetal and centrifugal) level factors. We 
examine the growth and international expansion of the ten largest companies in Denmark, 
Finland, and Norway over the period 1990 to 1999. Most companies in the sample became 
more international during the last decade across basically all the investigated dimensions of 
internationalization. This was particularly accentuated in the case of Norwegian firms, 
possibly due to their lower degree of internationalization at the beginning of the period. The 
study also shows that companies mainly have internationalized their operations activities, 
while such strategic activities as research and development activities and headquarters 
functions to a much larger extent are kept in the home country. 
 
 
It is generally accepted that, ceteris paribus, firms from small open economies (SMOPECs) 
tend to demonstrate a higher propensity to internationalize their operations than those from 
larger home economies (Bellak and Cantwell, 1998). The most obvious factor is market size, 
and the tendency for SMOPEC firms to venture to foreign markets is often explained 
primarily by this constraint.  
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At the same time, many industries are increasingly becoming global. Factors like 
increasingly rapid technological change, convergence of consumers tastes, and increased 
world-wide competition, have led to a quest for scale, scope, and learning economies that, in 
turn, has motivated the development of increasingly larger corporations through international 
mergers and acquisitions. These are the factors that act as centrifugal forces in the 
internationalization process. Indeed, as firms are becoming increasingly global, the question is 
if there remains a role to be played by the local environment.  
We propose, along with Porter (1990) that centripetal forces are at play as well. 
Institutions, support infrastructure and related companies exist around, and because of, firms 
in a given location. The ability of such factors to meet the needs of the multinational 
enterprise (MNE) play a crucial role in determining the extent of their internationalization 
(Narula, 2002). For this reason, it has been argued that the home base play a continued or 
possibly increasingly important role for the global firm (Porter, 1990; Porter and Sölvell, 
1998). 
 Thus, there is an important interface between the micro level (firm-specific) issues and 
the macro level (country-specific) issues in firm internationalization that is not well 
understood. In addition to the issues of internationalization being a matter of understanding 
the centripetal and centrifugal forces, there is a symbiotic relationship between the MNE and 
its environment that has become exceedingly complex. This is not to say that there is no role 
for idiosyncratic behavior of firms due to differences in strategy. Rather, as suggested in 
Figure 1, the strategy of the MNE is formulated within the framework of the micro-macro 
interface. 
[insert Figure 1 about here ] 
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This interaction between firms and locations is axiomatic for all countries, regardless 
of size. However, we postulate that the micro-macro interaction is much more pronounced in 
the case of MNEs from SMOPECs, since they outgrow their home base more easily, and 
small countries are more dependent on their large companies. A major strategic error of 
management can create a substantial shock wave to the total economy. Therefore, the main 
issue for small countries is whether the centripetal forces stemming from the quality of the 
location bound assets compensate for the centrifugal forces stemming from the limited size of 
the local market. Or put differently; can the limited size be traded-off by a higher quality of 
locally bound assets? 
The firm's international activities can be divided into operations (such as production 
and sales abroad) and strategic activities (such as internationalization of capital, R&D and 
headquarter functions). We expect that the internationalization has, over time, moved from 
being predominantly “operations” oriented to becoming more strategic in the sense that it 
involves the ownership and decision-making entities of the companies, and that developments 
patterns will differ across companies and countries depending on the nature and strength of 
various centrifugal and centripetal forces.  
 We will investigate these issues for three SMOPEC-countries: Denmark, Finland and 
Norway. These three countries compose a particularly interesting set since they share many 
common features: they are affluent neighboring countries of about the same size, they belong 
to the same cultural “block” (Ronen and Shenkar, 1985), and their political institutions and 
traditions share many characteristics. Sweden and Iceland, -- the two other Nordic countries -- 
were left out because there are markedly different in terms of size.  
We focus on the ten largest companies in each country over the period 1990 to 1999, 
since these companies are those that are particularly exposed to the dilemma of retrieving the 
local roots while globalizing. These companies basically make up the set of large companies 
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in Denmark, Finland, and Norway, and the companies are commonly regarded as the 
economic locomotives of their home countries.  
The remainder of our analysis proceeds as follows. We provide a brief overview of the 
possible implications of globalization on the behavior of MNEs originating from small 
economies. The data are then described. The two following sections then report and discuss 
the findings of the study, with an emphasis on the implications for home countries.   
 
Globalization, small economies and MNEs: Centrifugal and centripetal forces 
There is considerable evidence (e.g., Freeman and Lundvall, 1988; Dunning and Narula, 
1996; van Hoesel and Narula, 1999; Bellak and Cantwell, 1998; Van Den Bulcke and 
Verbeke, 2001) that there are certain common characteristics of the small open economy that 
cause their firms to be more globalized than firms from larger countries. Globalization as used 
here will refer to economic globalization, which we define as the increasing cross-border 
interdependence and integration of production and markets for goods, services, and capital. 
This process leads both to a widening of the extent and form of international transactions, and 
to a deepening of the interdependence between the actions of economic actors located in one 
country and those located in other countries (Narula and Dunning, 2000). The literature has 
illustrated that small open economies tend to be more internationalized, with a relatively large 
share of the value-added activity being conducted with the explicit purpose of serving 
overseas markets. Furthermore, firms from these countries tend to be competitive in a few 
niche sectors, as small countries tend to have limited resources and prefer to engage in 
activities in a few targeted sectors, rather than spreading these resources thinly across several 
industries.  
At the same time, there is considerable variation between countries: SMOPECs are by 
no means a homogenous group. It is useful to analyze the determinants of internationalization 
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of SMOPEC-based multinational firms from two perspectives: factors that encourage 
internationalization (centrifugal forces) and factors that encourage concentration of these 
firms’ activities in their home location (centripetal forces).  
Some of the characteristics of small economies are a function of size per se. The 
limited domestic market size means that if such firms are to achieve economies of scale in 
production, they must seek additional markets to that of their home location in order to 
increase their de facto market size (Walsh, 1988; Narula, 1996; Bellak and Cantwell, 1997). 
The demand conditions at home may restrain the sectors and kind of ownership advantages 
that firms of a particular nationality develop. First, small market size constitutes a 
disadvantage in the development of process technology as economies of scale are not present, 
but may provide a competitive advantage in product innovation (Walsh, 1988). Second, firms 
from small countries have access to fewer kinds of created location advantages at home. That 
is, the infrastructure and national business systems tend to be focused in fewer industrial 
sectors. Globalization has also meant that firms increasingly need to maintain competencies in 
several areas, as products become increasing multi-technology in nature (Granstrand, Patel 
and Pavitt, 1997). Thus, if firms from SMOPECs require technological inputs not available 
locally they must therefore seek these in overseas locations (see Narula (2002) for a 
discussion). Also, companies seek out capital markets outside their home country for equity 
as well as for loan capital with the aim of lowering their cost of capital (Oxelheim et al., 
1998). All in all, the limited size of the home market works as the main centrifugal force of 
the companies located in SMOPEC-countries. It should be noted that globalisation has 
resulted in de facto economic integration – at least amongst the Triad countries – in addition 
to de jure economic integration projects such as the Single European Market. These 
exogenous developments have further enhanced the centrifugal forces on companies located 
in SMOPEC countries.   
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On the other hand, the main centripetal forces are the kinds and quality of assets that 
are bound to the home country. Industrial specialization in a given location is often associated 
with the kinds of assets that it possesses (or possessed) in abundance. Such asset advantages 
lead to a specialization of domestic firms in particular niche sectors (Soete, 1987; Archibugi 
and Pianta, 1992; Narula 1996). Obviously, these assets also tend to attract inward investment 
in these same sectors. Such specialization over a long period often leads to a development of 
successful clusters of firms and institutions that support a given industry, creating 
agglomeration economies in production and technology. For instance, In Denmark, the food 
sector has the features that characterize a strong cluster: several highly competent companies, 
strong links with suppliers, internationally competitive related industries -- e.g. manufacturing 
specialized machinery -- and a variety of supporting institutions and organizations in the areas 
of research, teaching, and quality control. In Finland, the forestry and pulp and paper 
industries constitute a particularly strong sector, whereas in Norway clusters can be found in 
the oil and gas, offshore, and maritime sectors (Benito et al., 2000; Reve et al. 1992).  
So far, our discussion has focused on the macro-level implications of increasing global 
competition, rapid technological change, and economic integration, including the possible 
impact of these forces on the economies of small countries. However, the forces of 
globalization also shape decisions and processes at the firm level. In order to understand the 
strategic moves by companies, we must distinguish between the degree of mobility of tangible 
assets (like materials, components, blueprints and products) and of intangible assets (like 
business practice, expertise and supporting institutions). Whereas companies can access 
global markets for most tangible assets, the intangible assets that are critical to such activities 
as R&D, design and core manufacturing are typically more embedded in the local clusters 
(Porter and Sölvell, 1998).  
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Even where strong clusters do not exist, firms are often most familiar with their home-
country situation, creating inertia. This inertia is associated with the nature of the national 
business systems of their home countries, and the level to which these firms are locally 
embedded. The level of internationalization reflects the extent to which firms are 
interdependent and co-dependent on domestic institutions and policies that have not only 
formed them -- and with which they are most familiar -- but which they have also helped 
create (Narula, 2002). Clusters are strongly path-dependent, and companies that operate in 
clusters have tended to maintain their strategic activities at home despite the 
internationalization of their production and sales. As argued by Porter and Sölvell (1998) 
while the MNEs may have global networks of subsidiaries involved in operating activities 
(like sales, service, local assembly and production), typically, strategic activities (like R&D 
laboratories, design and headquarters functions) are much less dispersed.  
However, this implies a view of the MNE as a traditional unitary firm in which the 
headquarters of the parent firm constitutes the center and other units -- domestic or foreign -- 
make up the periphery. In the past, the distribution of power and authority within the 
corporation, the control over critical resources, and the location of strategic activities versus 
operational activities, has been depicted as a center-periphery pattern with corporate 
headquarters firmly “planted” in the home country of the MNE as the unchallenged center. 
Even though such a description of a MNE may still find proponents, and perhaps even 
provides a sufficiently accurate description of some companies with international activities, it 
is a view that is now increasingly challenged (Forsgren, 1990; Forsgren et al., 1992, 1995; 
Zanfei, 2000). Companies are becoming more complex, less hierarchical, and less dependent 
on firm-specific advantages based on location-bound assets in their home countries (Hedlund, 
1986). Several important developments have been identified: the move towards more 
“geocentric” mind-sets, structures, and policies (Perlmutter, 1969), the evolution towards 
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multi-center or network structures in MNEs (Forsgren, 1990; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990), and 
the emergence of subsidiaries -- so-called “centers of excellence” -- that enjoy positions and 
roles of substantial strategic character and weight in a corporation (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 
1995; Holm and Pedersen, 2000).  
The ongoing transformation of MNEs is likely to affect companies from large as well 
as from small countries, but the impact and speed of change could differ. The relative 
importance of foreign activities is likely to be greater, on average, for companies based in 
small countries. Hence, small country MNEs may have had to respond quicker and make 
more substantial changes than their large-country based competitors. Likewise, small 
countries are hit harder than large countries by adverse home-country effects. Also, because 
small country MNEs typically take up a larger part of the economic activities, strategic 
misjudgment by their management may have severe implications for the national economy of 
a country. Our interest is, in particular, to investigate to what extent the internationalization 
development of small-country MNEs in recent years has followed the patterns described 
above. Based on the preceding discussion, we propose that: 
(1) Large companies have expanded their international activities at a greater 
rate than their home countries;  
(2) Their internationalization has, over time, moved from being predominantly 
“operations” oriented -- that is, selling and/or producing goods and 
services abroad -- to becoming more strategic in the sense that it involves 
the ownership and decision-making entities of the companies;  
(3) Developments patterns will differ across companies and between industries 
and countries depending on the nature and strength of various centrifugal 
and centripetal forces.  
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Data 
For each of the three Nordic countries Denmark, Finland and Norway, the 10 largest 
companies were selected. These are the companies that are particularly exposed to the 
dilemma of retrieving the local roots while globalizing. The group of “top-10” companies was 
chosen on the basis of total sales figures in 1999. In addition, the following selection criteria 
were observed. First, the companies should be predominantly nationally owned: i.e. the 
largest owner group should be domestic, or alternatively that the majority of stock is owned 
by home-country nationals.1 Second, because state-owned companies usually have rather 
restricted scope for strategic action, especially with regard to internationalization, such 
companies were left out.2 Third, companies in the financial services sector (banking and 
insurance) and in food retailing typically have restricted market scopes. Historically, most 
companies in these sectors have focused exclusively on domestic markets, and even though an 
increasing internationalization has been observed in these sectors in recent years (see Benito 
and Strøm (2000) for a discussion of internationalization in food retailing), the scale of 
international operations has been modest so far. These sectors were hence excluded. 
 Having decided on the companies, the bulk of data was taken from the annual reports 
of the companies.3 Additional sources of data were companies’ web pages and company 
directory services such as General Business File International. Furthermore, the companies 
were also contacted to obtain the information unavailable elsewhere (such as data on R&D). 
For all companies, data were collected for the years 1990 and 1999, thus making it possible to 
track the internationalization of companies over time. 
 The information collected can be put into three broad categories: (a) general company 
information, such as number of employees, type and number of industries; (b) accounting data 
such as annual sales, profits, return-on-equity, return-on-assets; and (c) a wide range of data 
regarding their international activities (see Dörrenbächer (2000) for a discussion of 
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internationalization indicators). Data in the latter category included, inter alia, foreign sales, 
number of foreign subsidiaries and international joint ventures (IJVs), number of division, 
business area, and/or corporate headquarters located abroad, and the share of equity held by 
foreigners. Also, information on R&D employment at home and abroad was obtained for 
Danish and Norwegian companies, but such data were unfortunately unavailable for Finnish 
companies.  
 
Results and Analysis 
The Nordic economies in the 1990s 
While these three economies share many similar features on a macro-level, Table 1 shows 
there are also considerable differences. First, they are roughly the same size in terms of 
overall GDP and population. They have also shared a similar high growth rate over the whole 
decade in question, but all three countries experienced some level of recession in the early 
1990s, with high unemployment and economic crises, resulting in industry restructuring by 
policy makers.  
In the case of Finland, the recession was associated with an exogenous shock. There 
was a collapse of the Finnish trade with Eastern European countries, especially with the 
former Soviet Union. In 1990, exports to the Soviet Union still represented almost 13 percent 
of total exports, but because of the economic and political changes in Russia and the 
abandonment of the earlier bilateral trading system, the share export to Russia dropped to two 
percent in 1992. That and the reduction in domestic demand commanded considerable 
restructuring in several industries and caused a number of bankruptcies. The Finnish currency 
was devaluated in 1991 and the exports to other markets than Eastern Europe grew steadily. 
The recovery of the Danish economy was associated with a substantial increase in Danish 
exports (up 33 percent from 1990 to 1999) resulting in a significant surplus on the trade 
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balance. In the case of Norway, the recession in the early 1990s was gradually overcome 
through, principally, disciplined fiscal policies, a centralized system of wage bargaining that 
was able to agree on fairly moderate wage increases, and a consistently high demand for oil 
and gas in a period that saw high prices for these commodities. 
Although all three economies have always had a dependence on a natural asset base, 
Norway has remained more dependent on natural resources, due largely to the discovery of 
significant off-shore petroleum reserves in the late 1960s. However, it has also managed to 
maintain a strong position in the fishing industry. It is a peculiar feature of the Norwegian 
economy not shared to the same extent by the others that the Norwegian state has always 
taken a strong interventionist position. There have been several waves of infant-industry 
development implemented through various degrees of import-substituting policies. During the 
early part of the post-war era, the focus had been on scale-intensive process sectors such as 
chemicals, while in the 1970s, its focus was electronic-based industries. The late 1960s was 
associated with a strong emphasis on fostering firms in this industry during the following 
decade. In some cases, the state has intervened through ownership of “strategic” firms, and in 
others they have fostered national champions. In most cases, institutions and infrastructure 
were built to support the targeted sectors. National control was retained through stringent state 
controls on inward and outward capital movements, although these has been a gradual 
phasing out of these institutions. Its membership of the European Economic Area has affected 
the Norwegian state’s continuation of its interventionist policies, as it must abide by EU 
regulations on subsidies and competition policy.  Contrary to both Finland and Norway, state 
ownership of manufacturing companies has always been insignificant in Denmark. The 
Danish state has also consistently followed a strategy of no direct intervention in the industry. 
However, it has been active in shaping the conditions for developing the manufacturing 
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sector, including educational policy, tax policy, competition policy and as a large demanding 
customer.  
Finnish exports were dominated by metals, engineering, and paper and pulp from the 
1960s until the mid-1990s. Since then there has been a clear change in the structure of 
exports. Electronics and electro-technical industry have become the largest export sectors 
accounting for close to 30 percent of the total manufacturing exports in 1999. Nokia has 
played a central role in this change -- and even in the whole recovery of Finland. The growth 
of Nokia, and its main suppliers, has been exceptional even by global standards. It has been 
calculated that in 1999 Nokia accounted for more than three percent of Finnish GDP and 20 
percent of total exports (Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2000). 
 All the countries in question are highly dependent on external trade and outward FDI 
(see Table 1), with trade accounting for more than 50 percent of GDP, and outward FDI at 
roughly 25 percent of GDP. It is important to note that the significance of trade has remained 
stable over the 1990s, while the importance of FDI has grown considerably, although there 
are important differences between the countries. Norway has remained outside the EU 
rejecting membership twice, first in 1972 and again in 1994. This has ‘pushed’ Norwegian 
firms to internationalize more strongly than what might otherwise have been the case. In 
contrast, Denmark joined the EU as the first Nordic country in 1972 and the membership of 
EU has since then been the main gateway for the integration of the Danish economy into the 
global marketplace. In the 1990s, almost two thirds of Danish exports went to other EU-
countries and more than 70 percent of the total imports came from other EU-countries. 
Finland became a member of the EU in 1995, and this has played an important role in its 
economic recovery.  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
Large companies in the Nordic countries 
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Denmark. Historically the agricultural sector has been important in Denmark, both politically 
and economically. This is reflected in the composition of Danish industry where food-related 
sectors including food manufacturing, and their suppliers (e.g. farmers and manufactures of 
machinery) make up a large share of the economy. The vertical links between suppliers and 
production companies are often strengthened by an ownership link where the production 
company is owned by the suppliers as a cooperative, as is the case with the second largest 
Danish company (see Table 2), MD Foods. MD Foods is a dairy company owned by the 
farmers delivering the raw milk to be manufactured into all types of dairy products. Over the 
years many supporting institutions, like research and quality control centers, have been 
developed around these companies to constitute a food-cluster. 
 Three of the ten Danish companies belong to the food-cluster. These are Carlsberg 
(the sixth largest brewery in the world), MD Foods (the largest dairy company in Northern 
Europe), and Danisco (the largest sugar company in Northern Europe). The remaining 
companies are more scattered in terms of industry category or cluster, although, four 
companies are included in activities related to construction; namely FLS Industries (cement 
factories), Danfoss (valves), Grundfos (pumps), and Rockwool (insulation).  
 In the last decade, most of the companies have been involved in substantial 
restructuring globally in their industry where the name of the game have been either to grow 
by acquisition and thereby become one of the big global players or be acquired by others. 
Some of the companies have made substantial acquisitions abroad -- like MD Foods 
acquisition of Swedish Arla Foods, and Danisco of Finnish Cultor -- and becoming the market 
leader in their industry.  
 There is a distinction between the highly internationalized companies with a foreign 
sales total scale ratio above 90 percent and the companies in the food-cluster that are more 
domestically oriented with a foreign sales ratio below 80 percent (see Table 2). However, it is 
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the companies in the food-cluster that have been most active in foreign acquisitions in the last 
decade. This is illustrated by the foreign employment ratio of 49 percent for Carlsberg and 60 
percent for Danisco, which clearly exceeds the foreign employment ratio of some of the 
highly internationalized companies such as Novo Nordisk (38%) and Lego (28%).  
 The companies in the food-cluster serve as an illustration on the interplay between the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces, where the centripetal forces consist of the strengths of the 
Danish food-cluster and the centrifugal forces stem from the international competition and the 
pressure for restructuring of the industry. The question that remains to be answered is whether 
the expansion of international activities will be at the expense of strong roots in the Danish 
cluster or whether it will strengthen the competence in the Danish companies by tapping into 
other knowledge bases. 
 A survey of the internationalization patterns of Danish companies indicates that 
Danish companies had, until quite recently, mainly internationalized their operations 
(Pedersen et al., 1998). Sales and service activities were internationalized to a large extent in 
the sense that these activities are located abroad. Production activities (including assembly 
and packaging) were also highly internationalized, but at a somewhat lower rate than for sales 
and service. Activities that were least internationalized were the most value-adding activities 
like design, marketing, R&D, and headquarters activities.4  
[insert Table 2 about here] 
Finland. Although foreign trade has historically been very important the more intensive 
internationalization of Finnish companies only started in the 1960s and 1970s. Truly active 
internationalization began in the 1980s. The 1990s saw a great deal of restructuring taking 
place in several of the largest Finnish companies, but companies continued to internationalize 
in those business sectors that they had not divested. In 1990, the mean foreign sales ratio in 
the ten largest Finnish companies was close to 70 percent. (see Table 3) The highest ratio was 
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93 percent in Outokumpu and the lowest – 40 percent – in Metra. Table 3 shows that by 1990 
the sales of Finnish companies were highly internationalized, reaching in 1999 a mean foreign 
sales ratio of 88 percent. This figure indicates the critical role of foreign sales in the largest 
Finnish companies. A typical example of significant increases in foreign sales is the Metra 
Corporation, where foreign sales increased from 40 percent in 1990 to 95 percent in 1999 
because of the substantial restructuring of operations over those years.  
The expansion of production abroad lagged behind foreign sales throughout the 
decade: the share of foreign employment remained clearly lower than the share of foreign 
sales (see Table 3). In 1990, the mean foreign employment ratio was about 36 percent, or half 
of the foreign sales ratio. The mean employment ratio had increased to about 55 percent in 
1999, a rate of increase in the mean value about the same as the rate of increase in foreign 
sales.  
All the largest Finnish companies have traditionally preferred acquisitions to 
greenfield investments. In the case of Nokia, there was also an intensive network of strategic 
alliances and other co-operative arrangements. The considerable growth in foreign sales of 
Nokia also increased the internationalization of the company’s main Finnish subcontractors, 
with subcontractors establishing and acquiring their own foreign manufacturing units close to 
Nokia’s main foreign units. The internationalization and foreign establishments by other large 
Finnish firms have not had similar effects to those of Nokia. In Kone and Nokia about half of 
the sales were from European countries and half from outside Europe, whereas in the other 
large companies at least two-thirds, in some cases even over 80 percent, were from European 
countries. Hence, most of the top Finnish firms are mainly European oriented in their 
operations, and some companies -- like Metsäliitto and Rautaruukki -- did not own 
manufacturing units outside Europe in 1999.5  
[insert Table 3 about here] 
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Norway. The sample of Norwegian firms is an eclectic collection, including their industry, 
size, and degree and rate of internationalization. From Table 4, three main observations can be 
made. First, there are no clear cases of companies that are dependent upon a single industrial 
cluster. Three companies in the set are, at least partly, involved in industries that have cluster-
like characteristics; namely, Norsk Hydro, Kværner, and Aker that operate in the petroleum 
and offshore sectors. A much more obvious feature is the fact that the companies, including 
the ones just mentioned, are almost without exception “old-fashioned” conglomerates that 
operate in a variety of industries and product categories. Second, there seems to be a 
distinction between those companies that operate in sectors that traditionally have been highly 
internationalized, and sectors that have been domestically oriented. This dichotomy is not 
unrelated to the predominance of resource-based advantages, which has been the mainstay of 
the Norwegian economy throughout the 20th century. Companies in resource-based sectors 
such as petroleum, metals, and pulp and paper (i.e. Norsk Hydro, Norske Skog, and Elkem) 
are all dependent on foreign customers -- as indicated by foreign sales ratios ranging from 85 
to 93 percent. (see Table 4) However, as expected given their reliance on local resource 
advantages, the foreign employment ratios of these companies are considerably lower: from 
23 percent in Norske Skog to 53 percent in Norsk Hydro.  
The traditionally high degree of state involvement in business (both as an owner, and as a 
pro-active regulator), has resulted in a certain tolerance for monopoly-like market structures 
in some sectors and targeting others through various levels of import-substituting policies. For 
some companies the tendency for home market-orientation is also associated with their 
protection from international competition. These firms have gone abroad relatively later than 
the resource-oriented firms that have had to face international competition much earlier. This 
can clearly be seen from Table 4 where companies such as Orkla, Mekantildata, Rieber and 
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Schibsted have a substantially lower foreign sales ratio on average than “traditional” 
industrial firms.   
Third, there were no distinctively large firms within the Norwegian sample by 
international standards.  The largest company in the Norwegian top 10 -- Norsk Hydro -- had 
total worldwide sales in 1999 of US$ 13.1 billion. In general, though, compared with other 
small countries such as Netherlands -- or Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland -- Norwegian 
firms were predominantly small with nine of the 10 firms in Table 4 having less than US$10 
billion in annual sales, and 8 out of 10 having annual turnover of less than US$4 billion.  
[insert Table 4 about here] 
Large companies in the Nordic countries: similarities and differences 
Firms from all three Nordic countries tend to demonstrate some similarities, as shown in 
Table 5. First, there is a predominance of resource-based firms. This is, in part, due to the 
traditionally strong clusters found in these countries in the resource-intensive sectors (see 
Hermesniemi et al., 1996; Reve et al., 1992). Second, Table 5 shows there were no truly large 
companies -- or “global giants” -- in these countries. In fact, with the possible notable 
exceptions of Nokia and Stora-Enso in Finland and Norsk Hydro in Norway, the top 10 firms 
really consists of companies that in other contexts would probably have been termed medium-
sized. One possible explanation can be that in all three countries governments have had an 
inclination to encourage and support the development of “national champions”, albeit less so 
in Denmark. Even though such companies have come to dominate their domestic markets, 
barriers to and/or lack of incentives to internationalize and the restricted sizes of these 
markets have prevented them from developing into large companies with world-wide 
presence.  
Third, a general observation from Table 5 is that companies in the top 10 league in 
each of the countries have became more internationalized across a number of relevant 
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dimensions over 1990s, specially in terms of foreign sales and employment rates. Moreover, 
their internationalization has been much stronger than the corresponding international trade 
figures at the national level. Internationalization patterns in Table 6 were measured by 
“operation” and “strategic” variables. These companies have predominantly grown by 
expanding their international operations, especially in the case for Danish and Norwegian 
firms, but less easily observed in the case of Finnish firms. Although both the foreign sales 
and employment ratios of the latter companies increased between 1990 and 1999, the number 
of subsidiaries remained stable and the number of IJVs actually fell.   
[insert Table 5 about here] 
[insert Table 6 about here] 
Internationalization patterns in Table 6 also revealed interesting differences between 
the national samples. First, the Norwegian companies have on average experienced a higher 
rate of internationalization during the 1990s than their counterparts from Denmark and 
Finland. This is true for most indicators of internationalization used in the study apart from 
growth in the number of IJVs, where the Danish companies display a marginally higher 
percentage change over the 1990 to 1999 period. The fact that the Norwegian companies on 
average were less internationalized in the early 1990s than their Danish and Finnish 
counterparts suggests that the Norwegian companies experienced “catch-up”, which in turn 
may partly explain their quicker internationalization pace through the decade. However, as 
argued by Oxelheim and Gärtner (1994), their stronger internationalization also reflects 
Norway’s decision to stay outside the EU, thereby promoting the re-location of value-added 
activities to units within the EU. 
Second, there are also important differences between the countries with regard to the 
extent to which their companies have internationalized beyond merely gained a larger market 
presence abroad or relocated production to foreign locations. For example, while the average 
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number of foreign subsidiaries of Danish and Norwegian companies increased by 76.5 
percent and 110.7 percent respectively from 1990 to 1999, the corresponding figure for 
Finnish firms is only 7.1 percent (see Table 6). In the case of Norway, Table 6 shows that 
there is also a clear development towards internationalizing strategic activities such as R&D, 
and the ownership of their largest companies has also become increasingly international. Even 
though there has also been a strong internationalization of Finnish companies’ equity, other 
measures of strategic internationalization have been less pronounced in the case of Finland, 
and almost absent amongst Danish companies. The internationalization of strategic activities 
is best illustrated by the increasing number of division or business area headquarters located 
abroad, which has gone from 1 in 1990 for Norwegian companies to 27 in 1999. The 
corresponding figures for Danish firms are 1 and 4, respectively. (see Table 6) By contrast, 
the number of foreign located divisional headquarters declined over the same period among 
Finnish companies. In addition, the only company in our sample that had moved their 
corporate headquarters to a foreign location was the Norwegian company Kværner.  
The overall impression is clearly that for all three countries the largest companies have 
expanded their operations activities abroad, but whereas Danish and Finnish companies have 
concentrated their strategic activities at home, several exceptions to that rule can be found 
among Norwegian companies. This may reflect a number of developments, of which two 
appear particularly important. First, the outsider status of Norway vis-à-vis the EU has pushed 
some Norwegian firms to re-locate strategic activities to take advantage of benefits that accrue 
to firms based within the EU. Second, Norwegian firms have tended to internationalize more 
as a result of weaker clusters at home. For example, the Norwegian metals sector has lost 
many of its former cluster characteristics (Reve et al., 1992), and there is  evidence that the 
traditional strong linkages between various maritime sectors -- e.g. between shipping, yards, 
and ship equipment -- have eroded over time (Benito et al., 2000). Companies have been 
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obliged to seek access to clusters in other locations, and therefore tended to re-locate strategic 
aspects of their activity more than Finnish or Danish firms.  
  
Summary and Discussion 
We have investigated the internationalization patterns of the top 10 companies from three 
small Nordic countries -- Denmark, Finland, and Norway -- over the period 1990 to 1999. 
Most companies in the sample have become more international over the last decade across all 
investigated dimensions of internationalization. This finding holds across the three countries, 
but is particularly accentuated in the case of Norwegian firms, partly due to their lower degree 
of internationalization at the beginning of the period.  
Small nations are becoming more dependent on their MNEs, yet find themselves in an 
exceedingly vulnerable position. On the one hand, the growth rates of their largest companies 
are typically vastly superior to the growth of the national economies, and as a result, the 
relative importance of the activities of such companies has increased. On the other hand, 
increased globalization pressures have forced MNEs to reconfigure their activities world-
wide. In order to survive, companies base their actions on what makes sense from a business 
perspective, and sometimes these actions may be in conflict with home country goals and 
policies.   
Globalization is characterized by increased cross-border interaction, but that does not 
necessarily imply a simple uni-directional outward movement. While MNEs may be forced to 
internationalize their activities and hence “grow” out of their home countries, at the same time 
they also tap into local clusters and knowledge and resource pools. Differences between the 
internationalization patterns of the top 10 Nordic countries suggest that centrifugal and 
centripetal forces are working with varying strength across countries. 
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The findings in this study regarding “operational” versus “strategic” 
internationalization are of particular interest. The high degree of “operational” 
internationalization can largely be explained by the needs to seek markets, lower costs and 
access resources outside the home country. Scale, scope, and cost pressures act as strong 
centrifugal forces that, in an increasingly liberalized and global economy, largely drive 
“operational” internationalization.  
“Strategic” internationalization is less a function of exogenous factors such as country 
size per se. A strong home country “embeddedness” counterbalances or neutralizes the 
motives for moving strategic activities and units to foreign locations. Such “embeddedness” is 
the result of strong linkages to government and to state and local authorities, of cultural 
affinity, the existence of well-developed and well-functioning national innovation systems 
and infrastructure, and the existence of strong industrial and local clusters. The essence is that 
such factors work as centripetal forces keeping certain types of activities in a given location. 
Of course, in the absence of sufficiently strong centripetal forces, internationalization of a 
“strategic” kind becomes more likely.  
Overall we find that a low degree of “strategic” internationalization typifies the top 10 
MNEs, especially those from Denmark and Finland. There has been some re-location of 
strategic activities among top 10 Norwegian companies. Our results indicate that this cross-
country variance between MNEs reflects not just varying firm-specific strategies. Although 
our analysis here is necessarily tentative, it suggests that important idiosyncratic differences 
exists between the three Nordic home countries, which ultimately reflect themselves in the 
activities of their MNEs. A more detailed analysis is called for to separate these various 
influences.  For instance, the dichotomy between Finland and Denmark on the one hand, and 
Norway on the other, is influenced by the integration of the former in the EU, while also 
reflecting the latter’s less developed clusters. The behavior of MNEs involves a complex set 
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of issues, and the macro-micro interface deserves more careful study than has hitherto been 
the case. 
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Figure 1. The interface between micro and macro level factors 
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Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators, Denmark, Finland, and Norway: 1990 and 1999 
 
  
Denmark 
 
Finland 
 
Norway 
GDP 
• 1990, in current USD 
• 1999, in current USD 
GDP growth 1990-1999: 
• At current prices/USD-rates 
• At 1990-prices/USD-rates 
 
133,430 
173,830 
 
30.3% 
25.8% 
 
136,911 
129,677 
 
-5.3% 
19.0% 
 
115,430 
152,926 
 
32.5% 
35.4% 
External Trade and Investment 
Exports: 
• 1990, in current USD 
• 1999, in current USD 
Imports: 
• 1990, in current USD 
• 1999, in current USD 
External trade in percent of GDP:a
• 1990 
• 1999 
Stock of outward FDI, mill.USD: 
• 1990 
• 1999 
Stock of FDI in percent of GDP:b
• 1990 
• 1999 
 
 
36,892 
48,993 
 
33,353 
44,274 
 
52.6% 
53.7% 
 
7,342 
42,035 
 
5.5% 
24.2% 
 
 
31,152 
48,520 
 
33,443 
37,996 
 
47.2% 
66.7% 
 
11,227 
31,803 
 
8.2% 
24.5% 
 
 
46,925 
59,681 
 
39,354 
50,481 
 
74.7% 
72.0% 
 
10,888 
38,423 
 
9.4% 
25,1% 
Employment 
Total employment:  
• 1990 
• 1999 
• Growth 1990-1999 
Manufacturing industries: 
• 1990 
• 1999 
• Growth 1990-1999 
 
 
2,605,700 
2,678,700 
2.8% 
 
479,500 
447,100 
-6.8% 
 
 
2,504,000 
2,296,000 
-9.1% 
 
556,000 
488,000 
-12.2% 
 
 
2,054,200 
2,280,600 
11.0% 
 
294,500 
311,000 
5.6% 
Notes: 
a Calculated as: [Exportt + Importt ] / GDPt ×100 
b Calculated as: [FDIt / GDPt ] ×100 
Sources: Statistics Denmark, Bank of Denmark, Statistics Finland, Bank of Finland, Statistics Norway, 
Bank of Norway, World Investment Report 2000 
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Table 2. The 10 largest private, non-financial companies in Denmark: some characteristics, 1999  
 
 
 
 
 
Company 
 
 
 
 
Main industry 
 
 
 
Total sales 1999, 
in million USD 
 
 
Foreign sales in 
percent of total 
sales 1999 
 
 
 
Number of 
employees in 
1999 
Foreign 
employment in 
percent of total 
employment in 
1999 
 
Carlsberg 
MD Foods 
FLS Industries 
Novo Nordisk 
Danisco 
Danfoss 
Egmont 
Grundfos 
Rockwool 
Lego 
 
 
Brewery 
Dairy products 
Special machinery 
Organic chemicals 
Sugar 
Valves and compressors 
Publishing 
Pumps and compressors 
Non-metallic minerals 
Manufacturing of toys 
 
4671.5 
3790.0 
3134.7 
3124.4 
2869.8 
2152.9 
1221.3 
1122.9 
1076.9 
954.8
 
70% 
64% 
80% 
99% 
77% 
90% 
75% 
92% 
91% 
94%
 
21,906 
13,604 
14,140 
15,184 
15,413 
18,860 
4,164 
9,699 
7,346 
6,284
 
49% 
35% 
65% 
38% 
60% 
58% 
47% 
57% 
81% 
28%
 
Table 3. The 10 largest private, non-financial companies in Finland: some characteristics, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
Company 
 
 
 
 
Main industry 
 
 
 
Total sales 1999, 
in million USD 
 
 
Foreign sales in 
percent of total 
sales 1999 
 
 
 
Number of 
employees in 
1999 
Foreign 
employment in 
percent of total 
employment in 
1999 
 
Nokia 
Stora-Enso 
UPM-Kymmene 
Metsäliitto 
Metso 
Outokumpu 
Metra 
Kemira 
Kone 
Rautaruukki 
 
 
Communication equip. 
Paper and pulp 
Paper and pulp 
Paper and pulp 
Special machinery 
Non-ferrous metals 
Engines and equip. 
Fertilizers 
Elevators 
Steel and iron 
 
 
21067.9 
11333.2 
8802.5 
6077.6 
3609.0 
3099.6 
2876.9 
2691.6 
2570.1 
2544.4
 
98% 
93% 
87% 
82% 
90% 
92% 
95% 
82% 
96% 
69%
 
55,260 
40,226 
30,963 
20,854 
23,274 
11,972 
15,551 
10,743 
22,630 
12,491
 
58% 
62% 
32% 
47% 
52% 
45% 
76% 
53% 
93% 
38%
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Table 4. The 10 largest private, non-financial companies in Norway: some characteristics, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
Company 
 
 
 
 
Main industry 
 
 
 
Total sales 1999, 
in million USD 
 
 
Foreign sales in 
percent of total 
sales 1999 
 
 
 
Number of 
employees in 
1999 
Foreign 
employment in 
percent of total 
employment in 
1999 
 
 
Norsk Hydro  
Kværner  
Orkla  
Aker RGI  
Norske Skog  
Dyno Industrier  
Elkem 
Merkantildata  
Rieber & Søn  
Schibsted konsern 
 
 
Fertilizers, oil, metals 
Oil field machinery 
Food 
Oil and gas services 
Paper and board 
Explosives 
Metals 
Computers, software 
Food 
Media and publishing 
 
13132.4 
9085.1 
3952.9 
3673.8 
2314.6 
1377.3 
1228.6 
1294.4 
988.8 
963.3
 
90% 
76% 
58% 
51% 
85% 
91% 
93% 
65% 
67% 
44%
 
37,900 
61,955 
25,037 
18,995 
6,315 
7,757 
4,030 
3,830 
8,428 
4,910
 
53% 
85% 
56% 
44% 
23% 
81% 
23% 
67% 
74% 
55%
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Table 5. Large companies in Denmark, Finland, and Norway: Mean values, 1990 and 1999  
 
   
Denmark Finland 
 
Norway 
  
Mean  
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
 
Total sales 1990, in million USD 
Total sales 1999, in million USD 
• Percentage growth 1990-1999 
 
Foreign sales ratio, 1990 
Foreign sales ratio, 1999 
 
Number of employees, 1990 
Number of employees, 1999 
• Percentage growth 1990-1999 
 
Foreign employment ratio, 1990 
Foreign employment ratio, 1999 
 
 
1,336.52 
2,411.90 
80.5% 
 
0.75 
0.83 
 
8,317.00 
12,660.00 
52.2% 
 
0.34 
0.51
 
3,452.09 
6,467.28 
87.3% 
 
0.69 
0.88 
 
21,382.00 
24,396.00 
14.1% 
 
0.38 
0.56
 
2,022.78 
3,801.14 
87.9% 
 
0.45 
0.72 
 
9,060.00 
17,916.00 
97.7% 
 
0.27 
0.56
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Table 6. Internationalization of the 10 largest companies in Denmark, Finland, and Norway: mean values  
 
      Denmark Finland Norway  
Dimensions of 
internationalization  
 
1990 
 
1999 
Percentage 
change 
1990-1999 
 
1990 
 
1999 
Percentage 
change 
1990-1999 
 
1990 
 
1999 
Percentage 
change 
1990-1999 
 
"Operations oriented" 
• foreign sales ratio 0.75 0.83 10.7%
 
 
0.69 0.88 28.8% 0.45 0.72
 
 
60.0% 
• foreign employment ratio 0.34 0.51 50.0% 0.38  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
0.56 47.4% 0.27 0.56 107.4%
• # subsidiaries 38.70 68.30 76.5% 82.80 88.70 7.1% 29.80 62.80 110.7%
• # IJVs 7.00 10.80 54.3% 12.80 11.90 -7.0% 8.60 13.20 53.5%
 
“Strategic” 
• foreign R&D ratio 0.22 0.23 1.2% n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.09 0.37 298.2%
• foreign equity share 3.50 4.70 34.0% 2.80 40.6 1350.0% 13.70 23.00 67.9%
• # division HQs abroad 0.10 0.40 300.0% 0.30 0.10 -66.7% 0.10 2.70 2600.0%
• # corporate HQs abroad 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.10 -
 
Note: “n.a.” denotes that data was not available. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1In the cases of Denmark and Finland, none of the foreign owned firms were large 
enough to being considered for inclusion, whereas in Norway there is a number of large 
companies that are foreign owned (e.g. ABB Norge, Esso Norge, Norske Shell, Elf 
Petroleum Norge). This is largely due to the importance of the oil and gas sector in 
Norway, in which some of the biggest oil companies in the world operate.   
2 In the case of Norway, that means that companies such as Statoil (oil and gas) and 
Telenor (telecommunication) were not included in the sample. 
3 The companies were selected from the following lists; Børsens Nyhedsmagasin: 
Danmarks 500 største koncerner in Denmark, Talouselämän 500 suurinta yritystä in 
Finland, and Kapitals 500 største for Norway. 
4 A recent econometric analysis on the Danish survey-data shows that the number of 
white-collar workers in Denmark is significant and positively related to FDI, while the 
number of blue-collar workers in Denmark is negatively related to FDI (Pedersen et al., 
1998). This indicates that the Danish companies are structuring their international 
network with operations activities dominated by blue-collar workers increasingly 
located abroad at the expense of their activities in Denmark, while strategic activities 
associated with innovation and value-adding are retained in Denmark.  
5 The big acquisitions made by Stora-Enso in the summer of 2000 in the United States 
have led to an expansion of sales to cover more of the Triad area, and may be indicative 
for a future trend among other large Finnish companies as well. 
  
